

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
----- 087865

R 281025Z MAY 75  
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2232  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TRIPOLI 0601

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, PARM  
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH TWO LIBYAN OFFICIALS OF U.S.-  
LIBYAN RELATIONS

REF: TRIPOLI 587

1. SUMMARY. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE LIBYAN AEC REACTED ANGRILY WHEN TOLD THAT USG APPROVAL OF EXPORT OF A NUCLEAR RESEARCH REACTOR IS UNLIKELY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT LIBYA HAD NO INTENTION OF MAKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND CLAIMED THAT HE HAD CONVINCED THE RCC TO RATIFY THE NPT IN RESPONSE TO OUR CONCERN. WHAT MORE DID WE WANT? WE ANSWERED REACTOR WAS SENSITIVE MATTER, AT TIME WHEN TWO COUNTRIES WERE WORKING AT CROSS PURPOSES ON MIDDLE EAST, AND THAT LIBYANS MUST UNDERSTAND THEY COULD NOT OPPOSE U.S. POLICIES ACROSS THE BOARD IN PUBLIC AND TALK PRIVATELY ABOUT IMPROVING RELATIONS AT THE SAME TIME. FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL SAID IT WAS TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATION ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS MIDDLE EAST THAT FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD PROPOSED MOHAMMED YUNIS KHALIFA AL-MASMARI TO US AS AMBASSADOR. HE MADE PLEA FOR U.S. TO GIVE ITS SUPPORTERS WITHIN LIBYAN GOVT SOME AMMUNITION. EMBASSY RECOMMENDS ACTION ON MASMARI NOMINATION AND AGAIN SUGGESTS VISIT HERE BY DEPT OFFICER. END SUMMARY.

2. FOREIGN MINISTRY FINALLY DID ARRANGE THE APPOINTMENT FOR CHARGE WITH ASKANJI, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF LIBYAN AEC,  
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WHICH WE HAD REQUESTED (REFTEL). ALSO PRESENT DURING

MEETING, WHICH TOOK PLACE IN ASKANJI'S OFFICE, WERE A JUNIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVE, ABU BAKR SA'AD FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS OFFICE, AND POLOFF.

3. CHARGE BEGAN BY REPEATING MESSAGE WE GAVE FOREIGN MINISTRY, ADDING FOR ASKANJI'S BENEFIT THAT IT WAS NEVER OUR INTENT TO MISLEAD, AND THAT EVEN THOUGH ANSWER WAS NEGATIVE, IT WAS NOT FINAL. WE HOPED THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH US AS WE COULD GIVE HIM A MORE ACCURATE READING OF USG POSITION THAN GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY COULD.

4. ASKANJI REACTED ANGRILY AND EMOTIONALLY. THIS WAS NOTHING NEW. LIBYA HAD TAKEN NUMEROUS STEPS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH U.S., AND ALL BEEN MET WITH SILENCE. LIBYA HAD NAMED AN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S., LIBYA HAD PROPOSED TO ADD TO STAFF OF ITS WASHINGTON EMBASSY (PROPOSAL, OF COURSE, WAS TO LIFT LIMITATION ON SIZE ON EMBASSY TRIPOLI) AND LIBYA HAD EVEN RATIFIED NPT (TRIPOLI 547). WHAT WAS THE U.S. ANSWER TO ALL THIS? U.S. DISCOURAGED EVERY LIBYAN INITIATIVE, A GREAT POWER PUSHING A POOR, SMALL COUNTRY AROUND. U.S. WAS PUSHING LIBYA INTO THE ARMS OF THE RUSSIANS. LIBYA WOULD DEAL WITH THE DEVIL IF NECESSARY. WHAT DID THE U.S. WANT FROM LIBYA? TO HUMILIATE LIBYA, TO MAKE LIBYA BOW ITS HEAD? LIBYA WOULD NEVER GIVE IN, BUT WOULD FIGHT TO THE LAST MAN.

5. CALMING DOWN A LITTLE, ASKANJI SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR TRIGA III REACTOR TO PRODUCE ENOUGH MATERIAL FOR EVEN A LITTLE BOMB UNLESS YOU KEPT IT GOING FOR FORTY OR FIFTY YEARS. LIBYA HAD NO INTENTION OF PRODUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ANY CASE. HE HAD ASKED THE IAEA TO SEND A TEAM OF EXPERTS TO LIBYA TO HELP WITH OPERATION OF THE REACTOR AND TRAINING, AND THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE IAEA WAS WELL AWARE OF THIS. WOULD HE HAVE DONE THIS IF LIBYA HAD ANYTHING TO HIDE?

6. WE REPLIED THAT WE HAD WELCOMED THE RATIFICATION OF THE NPT, BUT SUPPLY OF REACTOR WAS SENSITIVE MATTER. IT MIGHT HELP IF A HIGH LIBYAN OFFICIAL WERE TO STAND UP IN

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PUBLIC AND DECLARE THAT LIBYA WOULD FORESWEAR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

7. ASKANJI REPLIED HEATEDLY THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT FOR U.S. TAL6!J>TUHFFQRU1VFAAF#U(@P6TA<B1-H1QJ5@X!E/@(;S,Y+? + "RA  
D9,:7FF  
(4\*QS#.8,CH;QCBIQ=,K<CH;CF J(ID\$<N7Q"4P)+F/PKDCKJ@ ,2KRO.AT#

2 HD\$9W\$-AQJ)\*IT (RNMQW,J2J&?2

ADP000

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
----- 088030

R 281025Z MAY 75  
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2233  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TRIPOLI 0601

EXDIS

9. AT THIS POINT SA'AD OF FOREIGN MINISTRY, WHO TOOK A LESS EMOTIONAL AND MORE MODERATE LINE THROUGHOUT THAN ASKANJI, BROKE IN TO SAY THAT IT WAS IN ORDER TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS ON SUCH MATTERS AS THE MIDDLE EAST THAT FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD PROPOSED MASMARI AS AMBASSADOR. MASMARI KNEW THE U.S., AND HE WOULD WORK HARD TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. TO CHARGE'S QUESTION OF WHAT MASMARI HAD BEEN DOING SINCE 1969, SA'AD SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN A BUSINESSMAN, WITH A CONTRACTING BUSINESS IN BENGHAZI. HE EMPHASIZED THAT MASMARI WAS WELL-DISPOSED TO US. MFA HAD CHOSEN MASMARI TO BE LIBYAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON BECAUSE OF ITS DESIRE TO EXPAND CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION, WHICH WOULD HOPEFULLYKN BY STATES, LEAD TO A REAL IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS. (WE DID NOT ASK ABOUT MASMARI'S INVOLVEMENT IN ARMY CORRUPTION TRIAL WHICH HAS JUST FINISHED.) SA'AD ADDED THAT IF U.S. WOULD ONLY MAKE SOME RESPONSE TO LIBYA OVERTURES, FRIENDS OF U.S., IN FOREIGN MINISTRY AND ELSEWHERE WOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO DO BATTLE ON OUR BEHALF (I.E., WITH RCC). "YOU MUST GIVE US AMMUNITION SO THAT IF HE (I.E. QADHAFI) IS ABOUT TO MAKE AN ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENT, WE CAN STOP HIM." SOME STATEMENTS MADE BYNQCC MEMBERS HAD BEEN "MISINTERPRETED". WE MUST NOT ALWAYS TAKE THEM AT FACE VALUE. THE U.S. MUST GIVE ITS ALLIES WITHIN LIBYAN GOVT SOME HELP, SOMETHING TO SUPPORT THEIR ARGUMENTS.

10. COMMENT. TOO MUCH WEIGHT SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN TO WHAT EITHER SA'AD OR ASKAXRI HAD TO SAY ON SUBJECT OF U.S.-

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LIBYAN RELATIONS. NEITHER IS IN A POSITION TO REPRESENT LIBYAN POLICY WITH AUTHORITY. AT THE SAME TIME, WHAT THEY

SAY SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED.

11. WE BELIEVE LIBYAN-U.S. RELATIONS MAY BE AT SOMETHING OF A TURNING POINT. FROM LIBYAN POINT OF VIEW, THEIR OVERTURES TO US HAVE MET WITH STONY SILENCE. WHILE WE BELIEVE THAT THESE OVERTURES, INCLUDING DEMARCHE MADE TO UNDERSECRETARY SISCO IN JANUARY BY LIBYAN CHARGE, EMANATE BASICALLY FROM THE RELATIVELY PRO-AMERICAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, NOT FROM THE RCC, AND WHILE WE FIND THEM INADEQUATE AS A BASIS FOR A GENUINE IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS, WE TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REPEAT OUR RECOMMENDATION THAT DEPT MAKE SOME RESPONSE TO THEM, PERHAPS IN FORM OF A RANKING DEPT OFFICER'S VISIT HERE TO EXPLORE EXTENT OF LIBYAN GOOD FAITH.

12. ON QUESTION OF AGREEMENT FOR PROPOSED LIBYAN AMBASSADOR, WE THINK THAT DEPT MIGHT FORMALLY ASK LIBYAN EMBASSY TO CLARIFY MATTER OF AS APPARENT INVOLVEMENT IN ARMY CORRUPTION TRIAL, AND IN LIGHT OF THIS INVOLVEMENT GIVE US ASSURANCES THAT HE HAS QADHAFI'S CONFIDENCE. ASSUMING ANSWERS ARE SATISFACTORY, WE SHOULD GRANT AGREEMENT.

13. AT SAME TIME, WE MIGHT MAKE HARMLESS RECIPROCAL GESTURE OF LIFTING NUMERICAL LIMITATION FROM LIBYAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT HAVE PLANS TO RESPOND BY NAMING AN AMBASSADOR FOR PRESENT.  
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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** SALES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, NUCLEAR REACTORS, AMBASSADORS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 28 MAY 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** CunninFX  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** 75 TRIPOLI 587  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** CunninFX  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 07 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <07 APR 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <16 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** DISCUSSION WITH TWO LIBYAN OFFICIALS OF U.S.- LIBYAN RELATIONS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PARM, US  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006